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Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) by the Secretary of State
under § 1189 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 provide a
key means of thwarting global terror networks by isolating and stigmatizing such groups,
and by depriving them of financial and human support. This Comment examines the
role of classified information in the FTO designation process and analyzes whether the
Secretary’s reliance on classified information—to which designated FTOs do not have
access—comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, particularly
when the classified record is essential to the Secretary’s determination.
To answer that question, this Comment first traces a series of cases in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the tribunal charged with
hearing challenges to FTO designations, and argues that—notwithstanding
statements by the court evincing a reluctance to resolve the issue—D.C. Circuit
precedent has likely foreclosed access to the classified record by designated groups, even
when the information withheld is essential to the Secretary’s designation decision.
This Comment then presents a constitutional due process analysis and argues
that—because § 1189 targets foreign (as opposed to domestic) organizations, which
must establish substantial connections with the U.S. to receive due process
protection—courts should be reluctant to grant FTOs constitutional protection for interests
divorced from the contacts used to establish U.S. presence. Finally, this Comment ventures
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INTRODUCTION
Statutory schemes for designating groups as terrorist organizations can be as
powerful as any weapon in America’s fight against terrorism, because such
designations can effectively cripple targeted organizations by severing sources
of financial and human support. In addition to triggering a variety of legal
penalties, terrorist designations—imposed by high-level officials in the
Executive Branch—isolate and stigmatize terrorist groups, both from mainstream
society and on the world stage. These statutory schemes are “at the interstices of
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administrative law, foreign relations, national security, and counterterrorist law,”1
and they pose interesting—and perhaps intractable—questions about due process,
executive authority, and the role of the federal judiciary.
This Comment explores one of those questions: the reliance on classified
information by the Secretary of State in designating Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) under 8 U.S.C. § 1189, part of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The Comment first examines
the role of classified information in the FTO designation process, and then
analyzes whether the Secretary’s reliance on classified information—to which
designated FTOs do not have access—comports with the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, especially when the Secretary’s determination is
based largely or entirely on the classified record. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which is responsible for hearing
challenges brought by FTOs to their designations, has wrestled with the
latter question in a series of cases—but never squarely resolved it.
Part I provides an overview of the process by which the Secretary of State
designates FTOs, including the role of classified information and some of the
criticisms leveled at the process. Part II surveys a series of cases in the D.C.
Circuit grappling with the nuances of the FTO designation scheme and
considering the implications of the Secretary’s reliance on classified
information in making designations. Part III analyzes the scenario in which an
FTO designation relies upon support found only in classified material, such
that the designation cannot stand without the classified information. As a first
step, Section III.A closely scrutinizes the language of the D.C. Circuit’s
opinions addressing reliance on classified information. Against this backdrop,
Section III.B performs a Fifth Amendment due process analysis of the scheme.
Finally, Section III.C provides a comparative analysis by looking to a Cold
War–era designation system similar to § 1189 and to the contemporary line of
cases dealing with habeas corpus in the terrorist detainment context.
Employing these three lines of inquiry, this Comment argues that reliance
on classified information by the Secretary of State in making FTO
designations comports with the Fifth Amendment—even when the
designation cannot be sustained without the classified information and the
FTO has no access to that information.
I. SECTION 1189 DESIGNATION SCHEME
Following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the 1995 bombing
of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, AEDPA was passed by
1 Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 644 (2008).
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Congress and signed into law by President Clinton. The law reflected serious
concern by Congress about the threat posed by international terrorism,2
and took aim specifically at disrupting terrorism fundraising networks.3
In what is now 8 U.S.C. § 1189, AEDPA provides that the Secretary of State
may designate an organization as an FTO if she finds: (1) it is foreign; (2) it is
engaged in “terrorist activity”4 or “terrorism,”5 or has the “capability and intent” to
do so; and (3) “the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.”
A. Generally
Designation as an FTO under § 1189 imposes a number of serious penalties
on an organization. It is a federal crime to provide “material support” to an
FTO.6 Financial institutions that either possess or control any funds
belonging to an FTO must retain control of those funds and report them to
the Secretary of the Treasury.7 Financial institutions that fail to comply with
this requirement may be subject to a minimum $50,000 civil penalty.8
Membership in an FTO, the solicitation of others for membership in an FTO,
and the solicitation of contributions to an FTO all fall within the statutory
definition of “[e]ngage[ment] in terrorist activity” and therefore constitute
grounds for barring an alien from entry into the United States.9 The propriety of
2 See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.) (“[I]nternational terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the
vital interests of the United States . . . .”); id. at (a)(4) (“[I]nternational terrorism affects the interstate and
foreign commerce of the United States by harming international trade and market stability, and limiting
international travel by United States citizens as well as foreign visitors to the United States . . . .”).
3 See id. at (b) (“The purpose of this subtitle is to . . . prevent persons within the United States,
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to
foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.”); see also id. at (a)(6) (“[S]ome foreign terrorist
organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise significant funds within the United
States, or use the United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds raised in other nations . . . .”).
4 Defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012), “terrorist activity” includes hijacking or
sabotaging any conveyance, threatening or detaining someone in order to coerce another,
assassinating someone, or using (or threatening to use) chemical, biological, nuclear, explosive,
or any other weapon “to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property.” Planning, commissioning, or inciting such activities
are also included, as are gathering information and soliciting funds for such activities. Id.
5 As defined by 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012), “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”
6 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
7 § 2339B(a)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary of the Treasury may
require United States financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of any foreign
organization included in the notification to block all financial transactions involving those assets until
further directive from either the Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court.”).
8 § 2339B(b).
9 See §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i), (iv), (vi), cited with approval in § 2339B(a)(1).
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these severe measures is premised on Congress’s belief that “foreign organizations
that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”10
The express terms of § 1189 do not provide a designated organization with
a hearing, either pre- or post-designation. They also do not require that the
Secretary notify a designated organization prior to her publication of the
FTO designation in the Federal Register, though she is required to notify
congressional leaders in the House of Representatives and the Senate.11
Once a group is designated as an FTO, there are three ways that the designation
can be revoked: Congress may expressly remove an organization’s designation;12
the Secretary of State may revoke the designation;13 or the D.C. Circuit may
review the Secretary’s decision and order revocation of the designation.14
If an FTO believes that its circumstances have sufficiently changed “from
the circumstances that were the basis for the designation,” it may petition the
Secretary of State to revoke the designation.15 After receiving a petition for
revocation, the Secretary has 180 days to make a final determination,16 and
the Secretary must revoke the FTO designation if she determines either that
“the circumstances that were the basis for the designation have changed in
such a manner as to warrant revocation,” or that “the national security of the
United States warrants a revocation.”17 And even if an organization does not
petition the Secretary for revocation, § 1189 requires the Secretary to make
this same inquiry for every FTO at least once every five years.18
In conducting a review of an organization’s FTO designation, the Secretary
of State must base her decision on a documented administrative record.19 The
statute is silent as to what must be included in that record. As such, courts have
recognized that the Secretary’s record may include third-hand accounts,
information from intelligence sources, open-source information from the
Internet, and other non-traditional types of evidence—all of which courts may
struggle to evaluate.20 In addition, the administrative record may include both
unclassified and classified material.21 Therefore the label “administrative record”
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996).
§ 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).
Id. at (a)(5).
Id. at (a)(6).
Id. at (c).
Id. at (a)(4)(B). In an organization’s petition, it must provide supporting evidence. Id. at (a)(4)(B)(iii).
Id. at (a)(4)(B)(iv)(I).
Id. at (a)(6).
Id. at (a)(4)(C)(i).
Id. at (a)(3)(A).
See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin I), 182 F.3d
17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
21 § 1189(a)(3)(B).
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may be misleading in that it does not contain the sort of material that “courts and
agencies [typically] think of as evidence.”22 For that reason, the D.C. Circuit has
recognized that § 1189 is both substantively and procedurally “unique.”23
If the Secretary of State denies an FTO’s petition for revocation, § 1189
provides that the FTO may seek review of the decision in the D.C. Circuit.24
The standard of review mirrors the standard set forth in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA): the court is directed to set aside a decision by the
Secretary that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” or that lacks “substantial support in the
administrative record taken as a whole.”25 But importantly, that standard of
review applies only to the Secretary’s determinations that the organization
is foreign, and that it either engages or has the capability and intent to
engage in terrorism—the D.C. Circuit has deemed whether the organization
poses a threat to U.S. national security an unreviewable political question.26
After 9/11, America relied more heavily on the FTO designation scheme
in its fight against terrorism; the number of designated organizations
increased significantly.27 Today, the FTO designation scheme—and the
attendant penalties that flow from FTO designation—stand as central
features of America’s effort to thwart international terrorism.28

22
23

People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 19.
Id.; see also Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (Nat’l Council I), 251 F.3d 192, 196
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that “[w]hile [§ 1189’s] statutory procedure . . . sounds like the familiar procedure
normally employed by the Congress to afford due process in administrative proceedings, the similarity to
process afforded in other administrative proceedings ends there” because the designated organization lacks
the “procedural participation and protection” it would have in other administrative proceedings).
24 § 1189(c). The exclusive assignment of review in the D.C. Circuit has survived despite
occasional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2005)
(reversing a district court that allowed review outside the D.C. Circuit while noting that similar
restrictions in other statutes have generally been upheld and that the “scheme avoids the awkwardness
of criminalizing material support for a designated organization in some circuits but not others”).
25 See also People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 22 (observing § 1189(b)(3) employs “APA-like
language”). Compare § 1189(c)(3), with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (directing a reviewing court
to set aside agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” or that are “unsupported by substantial evidence”).
26 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 23.
27 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 654 (“Following 9/11, the number of designated FTOs nearly doubled
[as Secretary of State Colin Powell re-designated organizations whose designations were set to expire and
added new organizations to the list] . . . . By April 2008, the number had grown to forty-four.”).
28 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [https://perma.cc/DWJ8-KTJ8] (“FTO designations play a
critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for
terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.”).
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B. Criticism of § 1189
Section 1189 has been the target of much criticism, especially from the legal
academy. Some have accused the FTO designation scheme of becoming
“politicized” by the State Department.29 Others have argued that a § 2339B
“material support” defendant’s inability to challenge the underlying FTO
designation by the Secretary violates the Constitution.30 The Secretary of State’s
role in making the determination has also been challenged,31 and the judicial
review procedures have been attacked as inadequate.32 At least one scholar has
expressed concern that the FTO designation scheme raises constitutional issues
under the Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process because of the
scheme’s “disparate impact on the Arab Muslim community.”33 Another concern
is that groups—after having their financial assets seized because of the
designation—may lack the resources to effectively challenge the decision.34
Yet while § 1189—along with related provisions of law that penalize
assistance to such groups—has been subject to a great deal of academic

29 E.g., Andrew V. Moshirnia, Valuing Speech and Open Source Intelligence in the Face of Judicial
Deference, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 385, 405 (2013) (suggesting “political favor, rather than
actual fact-finding, may determine a group’s designation”); Julie B. Shapiro, The Politicization of
the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Effect on the Separation of Powers, 6 CARDOZO
PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 547, 547-48 (2008) (asserting that the FTO designation scheme
“defies the Constitution” and that it “has become increasingly politicized as the State Department
picks and chooses which groups to designate as foreign terrorist organizations”).
30 E.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, A Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 125, 125 (2003).
31 E.g., Micah Wyatt, Comment, Designating Terrorist Organizations: Due Process Overdue,
39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 221, 245, 259 (2009) (arguing that § 1189 is unconstitutional
partly because the Secretary of State is not the “unbiased adjudicator” due process requires
“preside over the organization’s opportunity to be heard prior to the FTO designation”).
32 E.g., Moshirnia, supra note 29, at 405-06 (pointing out that “[i]n a climate where the Government
may rely largely on classified (and therefore uncontested) hearsay, there are few, if any, effective
avenues of correcting or overturning FTO designations through the courts” (footnote omitted)).
33 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 672-73 (observing that “most of the groups subject to designation orders
under AEDPA are Arab and/or Muslim” and that “[i]n cases involving the use of secret evidence to support
allegations of material support to terrorism, almost all of the accused have been Islamic or of Arab descent”).
34 See Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process That Is Due to Alleged U.S.
Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1405 (2005) (arguing that U.S. entities whose assets are frozen
“are due much greater protections” because they are “unable to mount an effective defense when their
assets are frozen because blocking orders do not provide adequate notice of the charges against blocked
entities, and the evidence used to justify blocking orders is often not disclosed to them”).
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criticism, some commentators have rallied to its defense.35 And, in any
case, it has enjoyed considerably more success in the courts.36
As noted above, § 1189 prohibits “a defendant in a criminal action or
an alien in a removal proceeding” from challenging the underlying FTO
designation.37 However, individuals prosecuted under § 2339B’s “material
support” provision have attempted to challenge the underlying FTO
designation of the group they are charged with supporting—but they have
not been successful.38 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme
Court expanded the scope of the “material support” provision by expressly
rejecting an as-applied challenge to § 2339B by groups seeking to provide
international legal training and political advocacy assistance to FTOs.39
Indeed, AEDPA itself expanded on an earlier definition of “material
support” by constraining exceptions for medical and religious assistance.40
As a result of the failure of these challenges to § 1189 and related provisions,
today’s FTO designation process has wide-ranging ramifications for terrorist
groups. Professor David Cole, among others, has observed the interplay between
the § 1189 FTO designation scheme and the § 2339B “material support” provision,
and noted how the two reinforce one another in America’s war against terrorism.41

35 See Eric Broxmeyer, The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due Process and the Designation of
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
439, 487 (2004) (concluding that § 1189 “comports with procedural due process so long as designated
organizations are entitled to post-designation notice and hearings”); see also Ankush Agarwal, Comment,
Obstructing Justice: The Rise and Fall of the AEDPA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 899 (2004) (describing AEDPA
as “a necessary tool” in the fight against terrorism, and arguing that it “provides sufficient safeguards to assure
that the constitutional rights of loyal American citizens . . . will not be compromised,” though acknowledging
that “the rights of active donors and participants [in terrorist organizations] may” be).
36 See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 548 (observing “courts generally have been reluctant to scrutinize the
designations and to invade what they consider the province of the Executive Branch” and that, as a result, “the
Executive Branch now wields a tremendous amount of power to designate foreign organizations as terrorists”).
37 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2012).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2005).
39 See 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010).
40 See Donohue, supra note 1, at 652-53 (noting AEDPA effectively expanded the definition
of material support by replacing an exception for “humanitarian assistance to persons not
directly involved in [such] violations” with the phrase “except medicine or religious materials”).
41 See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV.
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2003) (“Virtually every criminal ‘terrorism’ case that the government
has filed since September 11 has included a charge that the defendant provided material support
to a terrorist organization.”); see also Wyatt, supra note 31, at 256 n.261 (“[T]here is
tremendous pressure to designate as many organizations as FTOs as possible, because the
only way to prevent ‘material support’ to these organizations is to predesignate them.”).
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C. Role of Classified Information in § 1189
Section 1189 provides that the Secretary of State “may consider
classified information” in reaching her decision to designate an FTO.42
Section 1189 further specifies that such “[c]lassified information shall not
be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified.”43
In subsequent judicial proceedings challenging an FTO designation, the
court is directed to conduct its review “based solely upon the administrative
record.”44 The Government is allowed to provide, for ex parte and in camera
review by the court, any classified information that was used by the Secretary
in making her decision.45 As noted above, the standard of review set forth in
§ 1189 is similar to that used in review of administrative proceedings: the
court is authorized to set aside the Secretary’s decision only when it “lack[s]
substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified
information submitted to the court.”46 Thus by its terms § 1189 directs the court
to uphold a determination by the Secretary when substantial support for the
designation exists in the classified record, regardless of whether the
unclassified portion of the record also contains supportive information.
Section 1189 does not provide any mechanism by which an FTO
challenging the Secretary’s decision may gain access to classified
information—either in original form or in any modified form. Thus, as the
D.C. Circuit has recognized, any classified material on which the Secretary
based her decision to designate an organization “may continue to remain
secret, except from certain members of Congress and this court.”47
II. A RECURRING ISSUE: RELIANCE ON CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN FTO DESIGNATIONS
The law governing the designation of FTOs developed almost entirely in the
D.C. Circuit, owing to that court’s exclusive responsibility to review the Secretary
of State’s designation determinations. That body of law in turn developed largely
from challenges by a handful of organizations to their FTO designations—most
notably an Iranian resistance group known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization
of Iran (People’s Mojahedin). This Part will examine a series of challenges made by
People’s Mojahedin and a few other organizations to their FTO designations, with
a focus on the role that classified information played in those challenges.

42
43
44
45
46
47

§ 1189(a)(3)(B).
Id.
Id. at (c)(2).
Id.
Id. at (c)(3)(D) (emphasis added); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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A. People’s Mojahedin I
In what would prove to be a long journey to shed its FTO
designation,48 People’s Mojahedin made its first visit to the D.C. Circuit
in October 1997.49 Together with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (Tamil Tigers)—both of which had been designated as FTOs by
Secretary of State Madeline Albright50—People’s Mojahedin challenged
its designation,51 which placed it alongside notorious organizations like
Shining Path, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC),
Khmer Rouge, and Hizballah.52
Confronting People’s Mojahedin’s FTO challenge for the first time, the
court acknowledged that the language of § 1189 was couched in administrative
law terminology, but nonetheless recognized that the scheme was unlike a
“run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding.”53 The court also observed that the
information relied upon by the Secretary in making her designation, and
included in her administrative record, “may or may not be facts” because § 1189
plainly did not prevent the Secretary from using “third hand accounts, press
stories, material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization’s
activities.”54 The public record used by the Secretary included information about
the Tamil Tigers gathered from the news media, Sri Lankan intelligence units,
the U.S. military, and the State Department.55 For People’s Mojahedin, the
Secretary relied heavily on a Central Intelligence Agency research paper.56
Due to the fact that both People’s Mojahedin and the Tamil Tigers were
clearly foreign entities—with no property and no presence in the United States
whatsoever—the court easily concluded that neither organization had any
constitutional due process rights.57 The court reasoned that organizations are
only entitled to due process after they both “come within the territory of the
United States” and develop “substantial connections” with the United States.58
Consequently, People’s Mojahedin and the Tamil Tigers were only allowed to

48 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 28 (referring to People’s Mojahedin by its
alternate name, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, and noting it was not removed from the FTO
list until September 28, 2012).
49 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d 17, petition for review filed, No. 30-4406 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1997).
50 Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997).
51 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 18-19.
52 Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,650-51.
53 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 19.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 19-20.
56 Id. at 20.
57 Id. at 22.
58 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 271 (1990)).
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contest the Secretary of State’s designations under the procedures specified in
§ 1189—in other words, the statutory rights that Congress chose to provide.59
Turning to the statutory text, the court identified a problem with
§ 1189: the Secretary’s finding under § 1189(a)(1)(C) that an organization
“threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security
of the United States” is a nonjusticiable political question, despite the fact
that Congress apparently directed the court to review that finding.60 To
avoid wading into the political arena, the court confined its review to the
Secretary’s findings that the organizations were “foreign,” and that they
either engage in terrorism or have the ability and intent to do so.61
Without the need to address any constitutional challenges, the court
concluded that the “administrative record” supplied by the Secretary of State
contained “substantial support” for her findings.62 In so holding, the court
recognized that the information in the record had not been “subjected to
adversary testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the
organizations affected,” but the court nonetheless performed what it
considered to be its very limited function under the statutory terms of § 1189.63
B. National Council I
People’s Mojahedin made its second trip to the D.C. Circuit in November
1999, this time alongside the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which the
Secretary had deemed an “alias” of People’s Mojahedin.64 The challenge was
to the Secretary of State’s October 1999 redesignation of People’s Mojahedin
as an FTO.65 The court concluded that the Secretary had complied with § 1189
in making her redesignation, but that the redesignation nonetheless violated
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.66
The National Council I court, like the People’s Mojahedin I court before
it, noted that the statutory terms of § 1189 make no provision for the
designated organization “to access, comment on, or contest the critical
material,” and that therefore “the entity does not have the benefit of
meaningful adversary proceedings on any of the statutory grounds.” 67
This time around, however, the court determined that the organizations
did have sufficient contacts with the United States to invoke procedural
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24-25.
Id.
Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2001), petition for review filed, No. 99-1439 (Nov. 8, 1999).
See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999).
Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d at 196.
Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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due process protection under the Fifth Amendment: National Council’s
ownership of a “small bank account” in the U.S., and its presence at the
National Press Building in Washington, D.C.68 And because the
Government argued People’s Mojahedin and National Council were
effectively the same organization, the court determined both organizations
had constitutional presence.69
Having decided the organizations were entitled to procedural due process, the
court next considered whether the organizations were denied it. The court looked
to Paul v. Davis, a 1976 Supreme Court case holding the stigmatic injury resulting
from police officers distributing flyers with the plaintiff’s name and photo was
insufficient to trigger a due process violation.70 The Paul Court distinguished an
earlier case, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, which held posting a notice prohibiting the
sale of liquor to a plaintiff accused of excessive drinking did amount to a procedural
due process violation since—in addition to imposing a stigmatic injury—the
notice deprived the plaintiff of his right to purchase liquor without a hearing.71 In
like manner, because People’s Mojahedin and National Council suffered more
than just stigmatic injury as a result of their designation, the National Council I
court found the situation of the FTOs more analogous to Constantineau, and thus
concluded a procedural due process violation had occurred.72
But the court’s analysis was not complete: it next considered what process
was due and when it was due.73 The court quoted Mathews v. Eldridge’s
famous three-factor test for identifying the relevant considerations:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest of the procedure used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.74

In light of the Mathews factors, the National Council I court weighed the
interests on both sides and held the Secretary had to provide both notice and access
to the unclassified record on which her decision was to be based.75 Still, recognizing
“the foreign policy and national security concerns” presented by the designations,
the court left the designations of People’s Mojahedin and National Council in place
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 201.
Id. at 202.
424 U.S. 693, 712.
Id. at 707-09 (discussing 400 U.S. 433 (1971)).
Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d at 204.
Id. at 205-09.
Id. at 206 (quoting 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id. at 208-09.
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and remanded to the Secretary to provide the required process.76 Thus, unlike their
first attempt, the organizations’ second trip to the D.C. Circuit resulted in the first
layer of judicial gloss being applied to the § 1189 FTO designation scheme.
C. People’s Mojahedin II
After the D.C. Circuit remanded the designations of People’s
Mojahedin and National Council to the Secretary of State with directions
to make the unclassified record available to the organizations to contest,
the Secretary re-entered the FTO designation in September 2001 and
subsequently entered another two-year designation in October 2001.77
Back in court to challenge the Secretary’s redesignation, People’s Mojahedin
attacked the use of classified information by the Secretary, arguing that use of
such material prevented People’s Mojahedin from “effectively defend[ing]”
against the Secretary’s determination.78 Analyzing this argument, the court
considered the two justiciable elements required for FTO designation: (1) that
the organization is foreign; and (2) that it either engages or has the capability
and intent to engage in terrorism.79 With respect to the first, the court dismissed
the classified information argument out-of-hand, noting that “there is not and
cannot be any dispute” about the foreign status of People’s Mojahedin.80 In other
words, the use of classified information for this element was not needed.
For the second element, however, the court recognized a “colorable
argument” to the contrary.81 Looking to language in Abourezk v. Reagan
stating that “the firmly held main rule [of our adversary system] that a court
may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera
submissions,”82 the court recognized that § 1189’s provision for ex parte and
in camera submissions to the tribunal was arguably problematic.83
In analyzing this argument, however, the court equivocated. Essentially
relying on National Council I, the court simply stated that because the
Secretary complied with the requirements specified in that case—notice and
a chance to be meaningfully heard—nothing more was required.84 Yet in
reaching this conclusion, the court proceeded to offer two statements that
are seemingly in tension. First, the court recounted its National Council I
76
77

Id. at 209.
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin II), 327 F.3d
1238, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
78 Id. at 1241-42.
79 Id. at 1241-44 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012)).
80 Id. at 1242.
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1242-43.
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decision, asserting that case “decided . . . due process required the disclosure
of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”85
But then, in the paragraph immediately following, the court rendered
that analysis dicta by flatly concluding that “even the unclassified record
taken alone is quite adequate to support the Secretary’s determination . . . .
that the organization engages in terrorist activities.”86 Indeed, the court
stated that even if no classified information had been provided to the court
at all, it still would have concluded the Secretary’s decision satisfied the
“substantial support” standard based on the unclassified record.87
D. Holy Land Foundation v. Ashcroft
In April 2003, a Muslim charity known as the Holy Land Foundation,
which had been incorporated first in California and then in Texas, brought suit
in the D.C. Circuit challenging its designation as a terrorist group.88 Holy
Land Foundation had been designated a “Specially Designated Global
Terrorist” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA)—a scheme similar to the FTO designation process.89 Its designation
resulted from President Bush’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was
based largely on information that the organization was “closely linked to
Hamas.”90 As the result of a Treasury Department order that flowed from the
designation, Holy Land Foundation’s assets were blocked.91
After concluding the Treasury Department’s designation of Holy Land
Foundation satisfied the standard of review required under the APA, the
D.C. Circuit considered the organization’s due process argument.92 Applying
the procedural requirements articulated in National Council I, the court
assessed whether the organization received notice and an opportunity to be
meaningfully heard.93 Observing that the Treasury Department notified
Holy Land Foundation of its intent to issue a redesignation and gave it

85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1243 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1244 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3)(D) (2012)).
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159-60 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id. (explaining IEEPA “authorizes the President to declare a national emergency when
an extraordinary threat to the United States arises that originates in substantial part in a foreign
state” and, in the course of such an emergency, to specially designate entities as terrorist groups,
a designation that “carries similar implications” to a designation under § 1189). IEEPA, Pub. L.
No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2012).
90 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 333 F.3d at 159-60.
91 Id. at 160.
92 Id. at 162-63 (stating the “Treasury’s decision to designate [Holy Land Foundation] . . .
was based on ample evidence in a massive administrative record” and was “clearly rational”).
93 Id. at 163-64.
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thirty-one days to respond to evidence linking the organization to Hamas,
the court held the Department complied with procedural due process.94
Like § 1189, IEEPA—under which Holy Land Foundation had been
designated—makes provision for ex parte and in camera submission of classified
information to the court in judicial review proceedings.95 Referring to the dicta
from People’s Mojahedin II, the Holy Land Foundation court recalled that it had
recently rejected a claim that ex parte and in camera submission of classified
material violated due process.96 But the court explained it “makes no difference”
that the decisions were made under different designation schemes and that
therefore Holy Land Foundation’s argument “that due process prevents its
designation based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of
no avail.”97 Only a few paragraphs later in its opinion, however, the court stated
that “[t]he ample record evidence (particularly taking into account the classified
information presented to the court in camera) establishing [Holy Land Foundation’s]
role in the funding of Hamas and of its terrorist activities is incontrovertible.”98
It would thus appear that the court reached a question which it had not
previously had occasion to address—whether the submission of ex parte and in
camera evidence comports with the Fifth Amendment’s due process
requirement. Unlike People’s Mojahedin II, in which enough support for the
Secretary of State’s designation was clearly furnished by the unclassified record
standing alone (rendering the court’s discussion of the Fifth Amendment
hypothetical) here the court was confronted with a situation in which the
classified record apparently furnished at least a very significant basis for the
terrorist designation. Additionally, here the court first addressed, and rejected,
Holy Land Foundation’s statutory arguments under the APA before reaching the
constitutional due process question. Because Holy Land Foundation’s APA claim
failed, the court necessarily reached—and answered—the constitutional question.99
E. National Council II
After the D.C. Circuit’s 2001 remand to the Secretary of State in
National Council I—where the court upheld the joint designations of
People’s Mojahedin and of National Council as an alias, but found
procedural due process violations in the § 1189 scheme—the Secretary
94
95
96

Id. at 164.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012).
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 333 F.3d at 164 (citing 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir.

2003)).
97
98
99

Id.
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
See also Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5, 29 (D.D.C. 2012) (interpreting Holy
Land Foundation to have “squarely rejected the proposition that due process requires . . . .
[an] automatic right to access classified evidence”).
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decided to retain National Council’s FTO designation.100 In November
2001, National Council returned to court to challenge that decision.101
Following the court’s earlier remand, both People’s Mojahedin and National
Council “availed themselves of [the] opportunities” to rebut the Secretary’s
unclassified record and argue the evidence.102 Despite that effort, in October 2001
the Secretary of State redesignated National Council as an alias of People’s
Mojahedin, though he noted he would review that determination de novo after
reviewing further submissions from National Council and from the intelligence
community.103 By May 2003 the Secretary decided to retain the alias designation.104
The administrative record by now contained largely the same materials
from National Council’s earlier designation challenge along with new materials
added by the Secretary and by National Council.105 After reviewing the record,
the court determined that the Secretary still had enough information to justify
his decision.106 Looking to the laws of agency, the court reasoned that the
crucial question in assessing the alias designation was whether the Secretary of
State had enough information to conclude People’s Mojahedin “so dominates
and controls [National Council] that the latter can no longer be considered
meaningfully independent from the former.”107
In answering that question, the court reviewed both the classified and
unclassified records.108 Although the court declined to disclose information
gleaned from the classified material submitted ex parte and in camera, the
court noted that “the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the
administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide
sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion.”109 Among the unclassified
information supporting the Secretary’s determination was an FBI report
stating National Council functioned as a political wing for People’s Mojahedin,
as well as evidence that the organizations had overlapping leadership.110
Having found that the Secretary had substantial support in the record to
justify the alias finding, the court next proceeded—necessarily—to consider
National Council’s constitutional challenge. National Council argued due process

100 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (Nat’l Council II), 373 F.3d 152, 153-54
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
101 Id., petition for review filed, No. 01-1480 (Nov. 2, 2001).
102 Id. at 155.
103 Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088 (Oct. 5, 2001).
104 Nat’l Council II, 373 F.3d at 156.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 158.
108 Id.
109 Id. (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 159.
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required access to the classified record and the ability to confront witnesses.111
Rejecting National Council’s request, the court reiterated its position from
People’s Mojahedin II, stating that the National Council I process requirements
“established the constitutional baseline for fair process.”112 But, as in People’s
Mojahedin II, the court need not have ventured an analysis of the constitutionality
of ex parte and in camera classified information submissions under § 1189 because
such analysis—by its own clear assessment—was not necessary to resolve the case.
Having found unclassified information sufficient to support the Secretary’s
determination, the court should have held its tongue.113
F. People’s Mojahedin III
Following National Council II, Congress amended § 1189 by eliminating
the need for the Secretary to redesignate an organization every two years.114
In its third and final challenge to its designation, People’s Mojahedin filed
a petition in July 2008 asking the Secretary to review its most recent
redesignation.115 It argued that revocation was warranted by “dramatically
changed circumstances” in the organization’s activities.116 Specifically,
People’s Mojahedin asserted it had taken a number of actions, including that
it “ceased its military campaign against the Iranian regime and renounced
violence,” “shared intelligence with the U.S. government regarding Iran’s
nuclear program,” and had also been removed from the United Kingdom’s list
of terrorist groups.117 The Secretary denied the petition.118
During her review of the petition, the Secretary provided People’s
Mojahedin with a “heavily redacted 20-page administrative summary of
State’s review of the record, which . . . referred to 33 exhibits, many of which
were also heavily or entirely redacted.”119 She also only notified People’s
Mojahedin one day prior to the redesignation’s publication in the Federal
111
112
113

Id. at 159.
Id. (citing 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing 251 F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2003))).
Two years later, the court confronted another FTO challenge in which it declined
to address the same attempt to access classified information. See Chai v. Dep’t of State, 466
F.3d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (declining to resolve a claim that the Secretary’s use of
classified information violated due process because the court was able to “uphold the
designations based solely upon the unclassified portion of the administrative record”).
114 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108458, § 7119, 118 Stat. 3638, 3801 (2004).
115 People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (People’s Mojahedin III), 613
F.3d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. (citing In the Matter of the Review of the Designation of Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
(MEK), and All Designated Aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Upon Petition Filed Pursuant to
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 74 Fed. Reg. 1273, 1274 (Jan. 12, 2009)).
119 Id. at 226.
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Register, and did not give the organization access to even the unclassified
record.120 In its suit before the D.C. Circuit, People’s Mojahedin again
asserted that the record lacked substantial support and also claimed several
procedural violations: failure to give advance notice; failure to provide the
unclassified record; and failure to disclose the classified record.121
The court agreed that due process had been violated and thus remanded to the
Secretary.122 Recognizing the Secretary had failed to provide even the basic notice
and access to the unclassified record required by National Council I, the court
determined that it need not even consider whether the administrative record
contained substantial support for the designation. It reasoned that because the
Secretary only told People’s Mojahedin of the pending designation the day before
it was made, the organization only had a chance to contest the record once the
decision was already finalized.123 The court also indicated that in some instances
the Secretary noted that a particular piece of information was “credible,” but did
not specify the element of the determination to which it was relevant, leaving the
court unable to effectively review the record for substantial support.124
On remand, the court instructed the Secretary to give People’s Mojahedin an
opportunity to contest the unclassified record, but emphasized that § 1189 does
not provide an opportunity for the organization to access the classified record.125
However—perhaps aware of the fact that, as discussed above, much of the court’s
precedent purporting to bar any access to the classified record was unquestionably
dicta—the court also stated that its precedent “suggested that this procedure can
satisfy due process requirements, at least where the Secretary has not relied critically
on classified material and the unclassified material provided to the FTO is
sufficient to justify the designation.”126 In other words, the court determined that
the classified record could be withheld—at least where it didn’t matter, anyway.
The court explained that “none of the AEDPA cases decides [sic]
whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified
material would comport with due process because in none was the classified
record essential to uphold an FTO designation.”127 In somewhat cryptic
terms, the court concluded that a grant of access to the unclassified record
alone on remand “may be sufficient to provide the requisite due process.”128
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 228 (“[W]e have held due process requires that the [organization] be notified
of the unclassified material on which the Secretary proposes to rely and an opportunity to
respond to that material before its redesignation . . . .”).
124 Id. at 230.
125 Id. at 230-31.
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 231.
128 Id. (emphasis added).
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In attempting to convince the court that her failure to give adequate notice
and access to the unclassified record was harmless error, the Secretary asserted the
“heart” of the basis for the designation was in the classified record—her logic being
that such information “could not have been shared in any event,” making the
procedural error inconsequential.129 But the court rejected that argument on the
grounds that the State Department had previously conceded the Secretary used
the “whole” record—both classified and unclassified—in reaching her decision.130
In a concurring opinion, Judge Henderson agreed the case should be remanded
to the Secretary, but only because the Secretary had conceded that she had relied
on the “whole” record and People’s Mojahedin had not had access to the
unclassified record.131 Thus the Secretary’s own admission, or suggestion, that the
unclassified record had some bearing on her decision is what justified the remand
for Judge Henderson. Having reviewed the classified part of the record during
litigation, Judge Henderson believed the classified record alone provided the
substantial support needed to sustain the designation, and stated that she would
have affirmed the designation if the Secretary had merely stated that she relied only
on the classified record.132 Expressing disagreement with the other judges on the
panel, Judge Henderson read the precedent to have “repeatedly emphasized” that
the designated organization has no right to access classified information under any
circumstances.133 For support, she pointed to National Council II, although she
recognized that court “acknowledged later in [its] opinion that the unclassified
record alone would have sufficed to support the designation.”134
III. CLOSING THE FILE: WHY EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
SUBMISSIONS SATISFY DUE PROCESS
Against the backdrop of case law surveyed in Part II, this Part employs three
lines of inquiry to assess whether the crucial reliance on classified information by
the Secretary of State satisfies due process under the Fifth Amendment. First, it
critically evaluates the relevant precedent discussed in Part II. Next, it analyzes
the issue using conventional due process principles by considering the interests
implicated by FTO designation and the procedural requirements necessary to
protect them. Finally, this Part considers two other situations that illuminate the
analysis by way of comparison: the Government’s blacklisting of subversive
129 Id. at 228-29; see also Brief for Respondents at 45-46, People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d
220 (No. 09-1059) (arguing that any error in failing to disclose the record was harmless
because “the intelligence information at the heart of the Secretary’s decision is classified
and could not have been shared with [People’s Mojahedin] anyway”).
130 People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d at 228-29.
131 Id. at 232 (Henderson, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 231-32.
133 Id. at 231.
134 Id. (citing 251 F.3d 192, 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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organizations following the Second World War; and the Government’s more
recent use of classified information in post-9/11 habeas corpus proceedings.
A. As-Applied Challenges Have Been Foreclosed by Circuit Precedent
In its final appearance before the D.C. Circuit, People’s Mojahedin argued
that although the court had previously rejected arguments that § 1189 was
facially unconstitutional, it nonetheless had never “considered an as-applied
challenge where the entire basis for the Secretary’s conclusion lies . . . in the
undisclosed portion of the record.”135 As noted earlier, the court apparently
accepted this statement when it asserted that “none of the AEDPA cases
decides [sic] whether an administrative decision relying critically on
undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in
none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation.”136
However, the Government clearly thought the matter settled, arguing that
the court had “repeatedly rejected arguments by [designated organizations]
that disclosure of classified information in challenges to specific designations
was necessary to avoid running afoul of the Due Process Clause.”137
As noted earlier in Sections II.A–C, the court’s disposition of People’s Mojahedin
I never reached constitutional due process because the court found the organization
hadn’t established constitutional presence in the United States. No clear rule can
be discerned from National Council I either, because in that case the court provided
no indication of how important the classified information was to upholding the
Secretary’s determination. Likewise, no clear disposition was offered by People’s
Mojahedin II. Although the court there properly reached constitutional due process,
the court itself rendered its discussion on the requirement of access to classified
information dicta when it observed “even the unclassified record taken alone” in
that case was “quite adequate to support the Secretary’s determination.”138
But despite statements to the contrary by the People’s Mojahedin III court, the
D.C. Circuit appears to have already foreclosed the argument that designated
FTOs must be given access to the classified record—either in full or in part—in
order to satisfy constitutional due process, even where the designation hinges on
the classified material. In Holy Land Foundation, while analyzing the argument that
due process requires disclosure of the classified record on which the designation

135 Brief for Petitioner at 54, People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d 220 (No. 09-1059); see also Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d 220 (No. 09-1059) (“In previous
appeals, the Court concluded that the public record contained substantial support for the
Secretary’s conclusion. Here, by contrast, the Government acknowledges that the Secretary’s
conclusion rests primarily on the classified portion of the record.” (citations omitted)).
136 People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d at 231 (emphasis added).
137 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 37.
138 People’s Mojahedin II, 327 F.3d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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determination was based, the court recognized that “[t]he ample record evidence
(particularly taking into account the classified information presented to the court in camera)
establishing [Holy Land Foundation’s] . . . terrorist activities is incontrovertible.”139
Key to resolving the question of whether the court definitively resolved
the issue of FTO access to classified information in Holy Land Foundation is
knowing how essential the classified record was to the designation decision in
that case. Although the answer may be open to some dispute, the court’s
characterization of the significance of the classified record—“particularly
taking into account”140—strongly suggests that the classified record at least
seriously bolstered the Secretary’s determination. To use the People’s
Mojahedin III court’s language, the question is whether the unclassified
information was “sufficient” to uphold the designation—or, put differently,
whether the classified record was “essential to uphold an FTO designation.”141
National Council II provides little guidance. There, the court again
acknowledged that “the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the
administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide[d]
sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review.”142
Although the court did assert the requirements of constitutional due process had
been conclusively established by National Council I and People’s Mojahedin II, the
court’s description of the criticality—or lack thereof—of classified information in
supporting the FTO designation rendered those statements dicta. Indeed,
People’s Mojahedin argued just that in a brief to the court during its third
challenge.143 The Government’s contrary assertion that the issue had already been
foreclosed by People’s Mojahedin I and II appears to be plainly incorrect.144
Although the Government may have relied on the wrong authorities, it
nonetheless appears to have stumbled upon the correct answer in its People’s
Mojahedin III brief. A close analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s cases dealing with
terrorist designations probably forecloses any access to classified information in a
future as-applied challenge. Only Holy Land Foundation produced a binding
answer to a due process challenge that was properly reached, and only in that case
139 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165-66 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added). Since the court had resolved the Foundation’s statutory arguments in favor of the
Government, this point was a necessary part of the court’s holding. And while Holy Land
Foundation ostensibly dealt with IEEPA, the court made clear that the distinction “makes no
difference” for the constitutional due process analysis. Id. at 164.
140 Id. at 165-66.
141 People’s Mojahedin III, 613 F.3d at 230-31.
142 Nat’l Council II, 373 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
143 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 23 (arguing previous statements by the
court “regarding access to classified information constituted dictum because the unclassified
portion of the record sufficed . . . to establish substantial support for the Secretary’s decision”).
144 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 37-38 (arguing National Council I held
arguments in favor of access to classified information were foreclosed by People’s Mojahedin I and II).
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did the court face an actual scenario in which a designated organization was
challenging a determination based—depending on how one reads the court’s
opinion—essentially on classified material. As one panel of the D.C. Circuit cannot
overrule another panel’s prior decision,145 the Holy Land Foundation court’s denial
of access to classified information—even where that classified information was
apparently crucial to the designation—is binding precedent in the D.C. Circuit.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently
confronted the classified information disclosure issue once again in Fares v.
Smith,146 a case in which several foreign individuals designated as “Specially
Designated Narcotics Traffickers” under a scheme similar to § 1189147 mounted a
due process challenge to the sufficiency of a “redacted administrative record”
provided by the Government.148 Although this redacted record failed to provide
much information at all, the court found that “two unredacted summaries of
privileged information” which the Government subsequently provided contained
enough information to justify the designation.149 The court thus looked to Holy
Land Foundation and National Council I and concluded that the plaintiffs had been
“afforded sufficient procedural due process under the circumstances.”150 The court
recognized that the D.C. Circuit in People’s Mojahedin III suggested a theoretical
“limit” to the Government’s ability to withhold classified material and posited that
a scenario in which no information was released would not be constitutional.151 But
the court held that so long as the divulged record provided the designated entity
enough to “effectively rebut” the basis for the designation, due process is
satisfied.152 And because the divulged, unredacted record in Fares clearly contained
sufficient grounds to uphold the designations at issue,153 any classified information
withheld does not appear to have been crucial to the designation decision.

145 See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[W]e
granted rehearing in banc to decide whether one panel of this court may reconsider a prior
panel’s decision . . . . The answer is no.”).
146 No. 16-1730-CKK, 2017 WL 1319716 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2017).
147 The plaintiffs had been designated by the Department of the Treasury under the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1908 (2012). That Act authorizes the designation
of “any foreign person that plays a significant role in international narcotics trafficking.” § 1907(7).
Designation carries significant consequences, including blocking of assets “owned or controlled by” the
individual. § 1904(b). The Act provides for ex parte, in camera submissions to the court. § 1903(i).
148 2017 WL 1319716, at *1-2.
149 Id. at *6-8.
150 Id. at *4-5 (citing 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). For the sake
of its due process analysis, the court simply assumed that the designated individuals would be entitled
to constitutional due process protection, although they were foreign nationals. Id. For further
discussion of that antecedent question in the context of FTO designations, see infra subsection III.B.1.
151 Id. at *5-8 (citing 613 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
152 Id. at *8.
153 Id. (noting that one of the redacted summaries provided plaintiffs much information
about “the illicit activities in which . . . they are engaged; how and where they purportedly
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B. Due Process Analysis
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”154 Determining whether
government action has complied with the latter requirement entails two
steps: First, a court must determine whether a protected interest—life,
liberty, or property—has been implicated.155 Second, the court must consider
the various interests of the parties at stake and identify the specific procedures
that are constitutionally necessary to protect the implicated interest.156
To decide “whether due process requirements apply in the first place,” the
first step of the analysis focuses the court’s attention on “the nature of the
interest at stake.”157 Although liberty and property are “broad and majestic
terms”158 that defy easy definition, the Supreme Court has provided guidance
to make the analysis more manageable. Liberty encompasses the innumerable
rights bound up in the pursuit of personal happiness and professional
success.159 The ability to work, raise a family, and travel, for instance, all clearly
implicate protected liberty interests.
Property interests also “take many forms.”160 Surveying several prior decisions,
the Roth Court distilled several “attributes” of protected property interests.161 To
qualify as a protected property interest, “more than an abstract need or desire” for
the benefit is required, as is “more than a unilateral expectation” of the benefit.162
Recognizing that the purpose of property is to “protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives,” the Court held that “a legitimate claim of
entitlement” is required before a property interest is subject to the protections of
due process.163 Moreover, in determining whether a person has a legitimate claim
of entitlement to support a protected property interest, it is important to
understand that “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution” but

engaged in those activities; during which time periods; for which entities[;] . . . and the
relationship between Plaintiffs and others implicated in the purportedly illicit activities”).
154 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
155 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972)
(explaining that only if a protected interest is implicated will the court weigh the interests
at stake and determine what specific procedures due process requires).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
158 Id. at 571.
159 See id. at 572 (describing liberty as including “generally . . . those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” (second omission
in original) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
160 Id. at 576.
161 Id. at 577.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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are instead “created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”164
In the second step of the analysis, the reviewing court must weigh the public
and private interests involved to discern the required procedural protections.
Mathews v. Eldridge famously articulated the three main factors for
consideration: the private interest affected by the Government’s action; the
“risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”;
and the Government’s interest, including “the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”165
As is frequently observed, the dictates of due process are not fixed for all
scenarios. Rather, “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”166 Mathews made clear,
however, that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”167 Still, the
Supreme Court has recognized that although due process is a “flexible” concept,
that flexibility only comes into play when a protected interest is in jeopardy.168
1. Step Zero: Constitutional Presence
An analysis of the due process that an FTO is entitled to receive from
the Secretary of State must begin with an inquiry into the organization’s
protected liberty and property interests. But even before that, because
FTOs are foreign organizations, a designated group must demonstrate
sufficient presence in the United States to invoke due process at all.
Ordinarily, non-resident aliens do not enjoy constitutional rights.169
However, the Court has extended Fifth Amendment due process protection
to aliens who “have come within the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with this country.”170 Thus in assessing
what process must be provided to a designated FTO—including any potential
access to the classified record on which its designation was based—it is first
necessary to identify the organization’s connections to the United States.

164
165
166
167
168

Id.
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (“To say that the concept of due process is flexible
does not mean that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility
is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that
not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”).
169 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).
170 Id.
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The D.C. Circuit’s decisions addressing FTO designations demonstrate the
significance of this initial hurdle. People’s Mojahedin I barely ventured an analysis
of whether People’s Mojahedin was entitled to due process, quickly concluding
that it and the Tamil Tigers were entirely foreign entities without any connections
to the United States.171 But in National Council I, the court determined that
People’s Mojahedin and National Council had established constitutional presence
in the United States based on National Council’s ownership of a “small bank
account” and its presence at the National Press Building in Washington, D.C.172
Rejecting the Government’s argument that these two connections were not
“substantial,” the court expressly declined to make a general statement about what
specific types of connections would suffice to trigger due process protection.173
Instead, the court simply decided—based on the unclassified and classified records
before it—that National Council had “come within the territory of the United
States and developed substantial connections with this country.”174 Thus the court
determined National Council’s contacts—its bank account and Press Building
presence, and any contacts that might have been apparent in the classified
record—qualified as “substantial” under Verdugo-Urquidez.
Despite heavy reliance on a single U.S. bank account in National Council I, the
D.C. Circuit subsequently addressed a similar scenario and found that the FTO in
question had not established constitutional presence sufficient to invoke due process
protection. In 32 County Sovereignty Committee v. Department of State, a group
challenged its designation as an FTO after the Secretary of State determined the
group was an alias of the Irish Republican Army.175 Observing that the designated
organization’s only apparent contacts to the United States were “that some of their
American ‘members’ personally rented post office boxes and utilized a bank account
to transmit funds and information,” the court held that the organization failed to
develop substantial connections with the United States and was therefore not
entitled to constitutional due process.176 Apparently, the crucial distinction on
which the court relied was that ownership of the bank account belonged to a member
of the designated organization, rather than the organization itself—even though
the member had used that bank account to transfer funds to the group.177
In sum, two things become apparent from the D.C. Circuit’s “step
zero” jurisprudence: Relatively minor contacts with the U.S. can suffice
to garner that organization constitutional due process protection. And
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
251 F.3d 192, 201-03 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 202 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271).
Id.
292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Id.
See id. (“The [record] do[es] not aver that [the] organization possessed any controlling interest
in property located within the United States, nor do they demonstrate any other form of presence here.”).
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relatively minor distinctions can make the difference between an FTO
receiving due process protection or not.
2. Step One: Interests Implicated by FTO Designations
If an organization challenging its FTO designation succeeds in
demonstrating presence such that it is entitled to Fifth Amendment due process
protection, the legal analysis then proceeds to identification of the organization’s
implicated liberty or property interests. In seeking to identify these interests,
National Council I looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis.178 That
case—in which police officers passed out a flyer advertising the name and photo
of a person who had been arrested for shoplifting—held that an “interest in
reputation” alone did not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.179 But Paul itself distinguished another Supreme Court decision,
Wisconsin v. Constantineau.180 In Constantineau, the Court struck down a
Wisconsin statute that authorized the chief of police to publicly bar sales of liquor
to someone whose alcohol consumption made one prone to various
misbehaviors.181 The Constantineau Court reasoned that the posting authorized
by the statute could be interpreted by the subject of the posting as “a stigma or
badge of disgrace” that could “expose [the subject] to public embarrassment and
ridicule,” a reputational injury such that “procedural due process must be met.”182
In attempting to reconcile the two seemingly incompatible decisions of
Paul and Constantineau, National Council I observed that the Paul Court had
focused on “the effects of the [Constantineau] posting beyond stigmatization.”183
Specifically, the Paul Court reasoned that the Wisconsin law at issue in
Constantineau had the effect of depriving the subject of the posting of her ability
to purchase liquor, a right otherwise enjoyed under state law.184 Only because
the posting in Constantineau “significantly altered [the subject’s] status as a
matter of state law” was an adequate interest implicated.185
Just as Paul distinguished Constantineau, National Council I distinguished
People’s Mojahedin I. In addition to being stigmatized by the FTO designation,
the court found that National Council was also barred from having U.S. bank
178
179

251 F.3d at 203 (citing 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
Paul, 424 U.S. at 695, 711-12 (holding that police officers’ distribution of a flyer to
“approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area” with the plaintiff ’s name,
photo, and the label “Active Shoplifter,” did not implicate a liberty or property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
180 Id. at 701-10 (citing 400 U.S. 433 (1971)).
181 See 400 U.S. at 434, 437.
182 Id. at 436.
183 251 F.3d at 204 (emphasis added).
184 424 U.S. at 708.
185 Id. at 708-09.
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accounts and from receiving “material support” from others—rights which
they previously enjoyed, and which presumably were more important than
the right to buy liquor.186 But importantly, National Council I ultimately
considered the organizations’ property interest in the U.S. bank account alone
to be an implicated interest under the Due Process Clause.187
National Council I also discussed—but explicitly declined to pass judgment on—
other potential liberty interests that might be implicated by an FTO designation.188
The court declined to decide whether either “the right of the members of the
organizations to enter the United States” or “the provision of material support or
resources to the organizations”—both asserted as liberty interests—triggered the
protections of the Due Process Clause.189 In declining to rely upon the latter
asserted interests by the FTOs, the court acknowledged that “the Secretary argues
with some convincing force that aliens have no right of entry and that the
organization has no standing to judicially assert rights which its members could not
bring to court.”190 And the court characterized as “plausible” the Government’s
argument that the prohibition on providing material support to designated groups
“does not affect the ability of anyone to engage in advocacy of the goals of the
organizations, but only from providing material support which might likely be
employed in the pursuit of unlawful terrorist purposes as of First Amendment
protected advocacy.”191 Indeed, the latter view seems to have been vindicated by
the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which
held that the criminal ban on providing material support to FTOs violated
neither the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech nor their freedom of association.192
To summarize, National Council I surveyed the potentially implicated
interests of People’s Mojahedin and National Council, determining that only the
single, small U.S. bank account was clearly a protected interest under due
process. It is also clear that stigma alone, without any attendant legal
ramifications, does not implicate an interest that triggers due process
protection.193 Something more than stigma is required. Indeed, National Council
I interpreted Paul to mean “that where the government issues a stigmatizing
posting (or designation) as a result of which the stigmatized individual is
‘deprived . . . of a right previously under state law,’ due process is required.”194
186
187

Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d at 204.
Id. (“A foreign organization that acquires or holds property in this country may invoke the
protections of the Constitution when that property is placed in jeopardy by government intervention.”).
188 Id. at 205.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 204.
191 Id. at 205.
192 561 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2010).
193 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 706 (1976) (“[T]he Court has never held that the mere
defamation of an individual . . . was sufficient to invoke the guarantees of procedural due process . . . .”).
194 251 F.3d at 204.
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In completing the step-one analysis for an FTO, then, it is important to keep
analytically distinct the preliminary question of constitutional presence from the
identification of protected liberty or property interests—though the answer to
the first question undoubtedly informs the answer to the second. It is “clear that
a foreign organization that acquires or holds property in this country may invoke
the protections of the Constitution when that property is placed in jeopardy by
government intervention.”195 But it would seem paradoxical to first determine—at
the constitutional presence threshold—that a designated FTO has access to
Fifth Amendment due process protection based on a single, relatively minor
contact, only to then venture a much broader consideration of potential liberty
and property interests of the organization entirely divorced from that contact.196
As noted above, D.C. Circuit jurisprudence indicates that in challenges by
FTOs, relatively minute differences in the contacts of designated groups with the
United States can make the difference in whether an organization can invoke due
process. If organizations can achieve constitutional presence based on slim
contacts to the United States, only to assert a variety of protected interests entirely
separate from those contacts on which their constitutional rights are based,
perverse results are encouraged. Like the Greek soldiers who pierced the defenses
of Troy in a wooden horse, an FTO would be able to gain the crucial foothold of
constitutional protection, only to garner significantly more due process protection
than required to protect its minimal connection. Aside from leading to paradoxical
results, the outcomes of individual cases would also appear extremely unfair. Why
should National Council and People’s Mojahedin receive a full suite of
constitutional due process protection solely because of a single small bank account,
while 32 County receives none despite its members’ similar U.S. bank account
used for funneling money to the organization? Such a distinction is unprincipled.
Moreover, given that Congress’s clear intent in enacting § 1189 was to target
foreign organizations,197 the Judiciary—to give proper effect to Congress’s
intent—should be careful not to expand the step-one analysis to include liberty
and property interests that are not constitutionally required. A contrary
approach would allow a savvy organization, after being designated by the
Secretary of State or in advance of such a designation, to establish a handful of
relatively minor connections to the United States to gain disproportionately
significant constitutional protections that it otherwise would not enjoy.
In analyzing the contacts required to achieve constitutional presence for
a designated terrorist group, it is important to note that the effects of such a
195
196

Id. (emphasis added).
Cf. Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 998 (9th Cir. 2012)
(articulating an implicit requirement of Fifth Amendment due process protection: that the
protection be related to the challenged action).
197 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A) (2012); see also supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
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designation—and hence many of the liberty interests impinged by such a
designation—are essentially the same in every case. For example, such a
designation will always have the effect of preventing financial and other
assistance to the group, and of blocking entry into the United States for alien
members of such organizations.198 Moreover, designation as an FTO will also
always carry many of the same social effects, including stigmatizing the group
and dissuading potential members from joining it. Indeed, it is the State
Department’s express hope that an FTO designation “[s]tigmatizes and
isolates” the designated group, “[h]eightens public awareness and knowledge
of terrorist organizations,” and encourages other nations to condemn them.199
Thus in those cases where the court found that an FTO lacked
constitutional presence sufficient to trigger due process rights—People’s
Mojahedin I and 32 County—the court also implicitly determined that the
interests implicated by the latter consequences, though felt by the respective
organizations, were insufficient to establish the necessary ties to the United
States to warrant constitutional due process rights. Thus when an
organization purchases property, opens a bank account, or otherwise
establishes a systematic presence in the United States, it should certainly
receive due process protection for those interests. But it should not, on the basis
of such contacts, gain entitlement to protection for a variety of other
interests—like deprivation of material or financial support, or barring of its
members from entering the United States—that affected the FTO both prior
to its establishment of constitutional presence and after such establishment.
3. Step Two: Tailoring the Process Due to the Interests Implicated
Challenges to FTO designations present a difficult problem. In
weighing the constraints of due process under the Fifth Amendment
alongside the criticality of § 1189 to the federal government’s campaign
against terrorism, how are courts to reconcile the two?
The Mathews factors provide the answer.200 In assessing the factors at
this second step, it is important to keep in mind the interests identified
in the first step. When discerning the constitutionally required process
for a given action of the Government, the process must be tailored to
protect only those interests legitimately implicated by the government
action. It is for this reason that an expansive interpretation of the interests
198
199
200

See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 28.
This is particularly true when it comes to the use of classified information in
judicial review of agency action. Cf., e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno,
70 F.3d 1045, 1068-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the Mathews test to find the use of
undisclosed classified information in INS legalization proceedings “violates due process”).
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implicated by an FTO designation can seriously skew the second-step
analysis in favor of the FTO beyond what would otherwise be required.
Given that the FTO designation scheme lies at the heart of the nation’s security
and counterterrorism strategy,201 it should not be surprising that much of the
information feeding the Secretary of State’s determinations comes from the U.S.
intelligence community.202 The Government’s interest in collecting and using such
intelligence is great—indeed the very purpose of collecting it is to inform the
decisionmaking of high-level executive branch officials charged with conducting
the nation’s foreign policy and ensuring national security.
The inability to access the classified record relied upon by the Secretary of
State undoubtedly hampers the designated organization’s ability to mount an
effective legal challenge, especially when a crucial basis for the designation is
contained only in the classified record.203 People’s Mojahedin III itself illustrates the
practical difficulties of such a challenge. Because counsel for People’s Mojahedin
did not have access to the classified record, they were forced to argue the
Secretary’s classified material probably didn’t contain substantial support for the
designation, largely by pointing to a similar proceeding in the United Kingdom
which had concluded that the organization no longer posed a terror risk.204
The risk of erroneous deprivation is also certainly greater when those being
subjected to government action are unable to access the full record on which the
Government’s decision is based. For example, in its third round of litigation,
People’s Mojahedin worried that some of that classified information could contain
“outlandish allegations disseminated by the Iranian intelligence services, whose
task is to ensure that [People’s Mojahedin]’s FTO designation is maintained.”205
As noted earlier, Professor Donohue has described the designation process for
terrorist groups as lying at the intersection of several areas of law, including foreign
relations and national security.206 Given that observation, it would seem that an
FTO designation decision by the Secretary of State—even if not a decision which
falls entirely within the Executive’s prerogative to conduct the nation’s foreign
affairs—is at least heavily infused with the character of a foreign policy
decision. Indeed, the State Department’s decision to designate an organization
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See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See also Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that in the court’s experience the
Secretary’s administrative record in FTO designation challenges usually contains classified information).
203 See Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acknowledging the difficulties
posed for a petitioner who—“like Joseph K. in The Trial—can prevail . . . only if he can rebut
the undisclosed evidence against him, i.e., prove that he is not a terrorist regardless of what
might be implied by the Government’s confidential information. It is difficult to imagine how
even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.”).
204 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 49-51.
205 Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 23.
206 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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as an FTO is in large part directed at foreign governments, because fighting
terrorism requires a coordinated response from the international community.207
Although the Judiciary’s role in addressing constitutional questions is of
course incontestable, courts should be careful to interpret the constitutional
requirements of due process for FTOs with a presence in the United
States with proper consideration given to the Executive’s constitutional
role in conducting foreign relations and fighting terrorism.208
The Government has at least one interest that cuts against withholding
classified information in FTO designation challenges: promoting “fairness in the
adjudications of United States courts.”209 But aside from that amorphous and
hard-to-measure interest, the Government has several compelling interests in
safeguarding national security, protecting classified information, and fighting
terrorism in an efficient, cost-effective manner. Judge Friendly once observed
that courts began requiring hearings more frequently after the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.210 Acknowledging the “vast increase in the
number and types of hearings required in all areas in which the government and
the individual interact,” Judge Friendly reasoned that “common sense dictates”
that in many cases involving agency adjudicative decisions the Government could
satisfy its burden with “less than full trial-type hearings.”211 In particular, cost is
a legitimate concern because each new procedural protection afforded will cost
the government money and presumably carry additional risks.212 Although the
precise application of the balancing test will always be “uncertain and subjective,”
it is clear that the “required degree of procedural safeguards varies . . . inversely
with the burden and any other adverse consequences of affording it.”213
207 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 28 (noting two of the purposes of an
FTO designation: to “encourage other nations” to block terrorism financing; and to send
“[s]ignals to other governments [of] our concern about named organizations”).
208 See generally Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114
(1948) (stating that decisions which “embody Presidential discretion as to political matters
[are] beyond the competence of the courts to adjudicate”).
209 Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting “grave concern[s over]
. . . heavy reliance upon in camera ex parte evidence”); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-71 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[D]emocracy implies respect for
the elementary rights of man, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must
therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights . . . . Appearances in the dark are apt to look different in the light of day.”).
210 See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. P A . L. R EV . 1267, 1267-68
(1975) (questioning whether “the executive [should] be placed in a position where it can take
no action affecting a citizen without a hearing”).
211 Id. at 1268.
212 See id. at 1276 (“[P]rocedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources,
. . . at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially
outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and . . . the expense of protecting those
likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets of the deserving.”).
213 Id. at 1278 (footnote omitted).
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A criminal proceeding, of course, is different—and the Government rightly
faces a much higher threshold when seeking to conceal classified information
that is being used to convict.214 Yet although some have argued that the damage
inflicted on a designated FTO is comparable to that of a convicted criminal,215
that argument is misguided. While the ramifications of an FTO designation
are no doubt serious, it would be facetious to suggest that hindering a group’s
ability to fundraise and carry out its operations is a punishment on par with
incarceration and the attendant consequences that flow from a criminal
conviction. Indeed, the separate federal criminal ban on providing material
support to FTOs does entail criminal prosecutions with the latter consequences
and attendant safeguards, but those proceedings are entirely separate and
distinct from the designation of an FTO. And the Supreme Court already held
that criminal ban passed constitutional muster in Humanitarian Law Project.216
Balancing the organization’s interest in the bank account and the
Government’s interest in national security, National Council I was careful to
distinguish the what from the when of due process analysis.217 The court relied
on United States v. Yunis for the proposition that “the United States enjoys a
privilege in classified information affecting national security so strong that
even a criminal defendant to whose defense such information is relevant
cannot pierce that privilege absent a specific showing of materiality.”218 The
court reasoned such an interest in classified national security information
informs the what rather than the when of due process analysis.219
The court determined the when of due process requires the Secretary of
State to afford organizations notice and an opportunity to rebut the Secretary’s
record prior to her making the FTO designation, reasoning that pre-deprivation
process “would [not] interfere with the Secretary’s duty to carry out foreign
policy.”220 But the court nonetheless held that the what of due process only
required that the Secretary grant access to the unclassified portions of the
record.221 Relying heavily on the flexible due process standard set forth in

214 See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (“Where the disclosure of
[classified information] . . . is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause . . . . [the] court may require disclosure and, if
the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action.”).
215 See, e.g., Nice-Petersen, supra note 34, at 1414.
216 See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
217 251 F.3d 192, 205-07 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the what component of due process is
concerned with the specific procedures that must be afforded, while the when is concerned with
“whether due process may be effectively provided post-deprivation as opposed to pre-deprivation”).
218 Id. at 207-08 (citing 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
219 Id.
220 See id. at 207-08. The court did, however, provide a caveat that the Secretary may wait until after
the designation is made in cases where she can show a “particularized need.” Id. at 208.
221 Id. at 208-09.
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Mathews, the court required the Secretary provide the organizations “the
opportunity to present, at least in written form, such evidence as those entities
may be able to produce to rebut the administrative record.”222 No such
requirement applied to the classified record. Regarding the Secretary’s reliance
on classified information, the court stated simply that she “need not disclose the
classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte,” because such
information “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive.”223
However, in Abourezk v. Reagan the D.C. Circuit identified a “firmly held main
rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in
camera submissions.”224 The Abourezk court stated that “[o]nly in the most
extraordinary circumstances does our precedent countenance court reliance upon
ex parte evidence to decide the merits of a dispute,” pointing to Molerio v. Federal
Bureau of Investigation as an example of such an “extraordinary” case.225 Because in
Molerio the Government demonstrated “acute national security concerns” and
the plaintiff “had been accorded considerable discovery of non-[classified]
materials,” the use of ex parte, in camera evidence was permissible.226 This holding
was despite the fact that the use of such classified information posed a “large risk
that an unjust result would eventuate if the case proceeded without the privileged
material”227—in other words, a great risk of erroneous deprivation.
Importantly, the other explicit exceptions to Abourezk’s “main rule” were those
“specified by statute,” although in such cases the courts still must “confine to a
narrow path submissions not in accord with our general mode of open
proceedings.”228 Section 1189 is such a statutory scheme—and therefore should not
be subject to the general rule prohibiting disposition of the merits of a case on in
camera, ex parte classified evidence. Generally the parties to a proceeding must be
accorded full access to the information being used against them as a requirement of
due process.229 But as Abourezk noted, this is not always the case—particularly when
compelling national security interests are at stake, and when Congress has expressly
addressed the precise question as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme
designed to facilitate the Secretary of State’s conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs.
In Jifry v. FAA, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the claims of “two non-resident
alien pilots” who alleged that the Federal Aviation Administration violated the
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 209.
Id. at 208.
785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (1986).
Id. (citing 749 F.2d 815, 819-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“The validity . . . of a conclusion largely depend[s] on the mode by which it was reached.
Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking . . . . No better instrument has been derived for arriving at truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”).
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Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by revoking their airman certificates.230
The pilots argued that “they were denied meaningful notice of the evidence
against them and a meaningful opportunity to be heard” because they were
denied access to the classified information on which the revocations were
based.231 The court rejected that argument, relying explicitly on the line of cases
dealing with People’s Mojahedin.232 In weighing the interests at stake, the Jifry
court stated that the pilots’ interest “in possessing FAA airman certificates to fly
foreign aircraft outside of the United States . . . pales in significance to the
government’s security interests in preventing pilots from using civil aircraft as
instruments of terror.”233 The plaintiffs’ attempt to prevent the Government
from relying on classified information ex parte and in camera, the court stated,
was “not well-taken.”234 Indeed, the Government in People’s Mojahedin III pointed
to Jifry to support its argument that agency “decision[s] based on classified
information not disclosed to the relevant parties or their attorneys” do not violate
due process, and “that it is perfectly proper for the [c]ourt to take this classified
information into account ex parte/in camera as it reviews the agency action.”235
People’s Mojahedin responded by distinguishing its situation from the facts
of Jifry. The group argued that the § 1189 designation scheme “impinges on the
fundamental rights” of the organization and its “U.S. supporters.”236 But again,
this argument is misguided. An FTO has no constitutional due process
rights—fundamental or otherwise—until it establishes substantial connections
with the United States.237 Once it establishes such connections to the United
States—by purchasing property, opening a bank account, or establishing a
continual place of business—it must be accorded constitutional due process
protections to safeguard those interests.238 But it is hard to see how, by
establishing a single small bank account or other comparable contact with the
United States, National Council had somehow earned for itself “fundamental
rights” unrelated to that bank account that must be accorded constitutional
protection. Given the low threshold set by the D.C. Circuit for what qualifies
as “substantial,” a contrary approach would prove absurd.239 And because the
effects of the designation would have been felt equally by National Council whether
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370 F.3d 1174, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1176, 1184.
Id. at 1183-84 (citing People’s Mojahedin II, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
233 Id. at 1183 (emphasis added).
234 Id. at 1182.
235 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 39.
236 Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 25.
237 See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
239 See also supra text accompanying notes 195–96.
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or not it possessed a small U.S. bank account, it seems far-fetched to suggest that
contact should drastically alter the bank’s level of constitutional protection.
Indeed, even sensitive—but less-than-classified—information may sometimes
be constitutionally withheld from an organization challenging its terrorist
designation based on the public and private interests involved. In Al-Aqeel v.
Paulson, a Saudi Arabian citizen challenged his terrorist designation by the
Secretary of the Treasury under IEEPA.240 The court first determined the
petitioner had established a constitutional presence in the United States such that
he could invoke due process.241 The petitioner sought access to the sensitive but
unclassified information in the record, arguing “that because IEEPA provides for
ex parte and in camera judicial review of classified portions of the record in a
challenge to a designation under the Act, he [was] therefore entitled to the nonclassified portions of the record, including privileged and [sensitive but
unclassified] materials.”242 The court rejected that request, explaining that a
petitioner’s access to privileged but unclassified materials is “determined by
a ten-factor balancing test” set forth in Frankenhauser v. Rizzo.243 Based on
that test, the court held that the petitioner did not provide a “legal basis for
obtaining the privileged portions of the Administrative Record.”244
Thus Al-Aqeel illustrates that even information less sensitive than classified
information may be constitutionally withheld from a party seeking revocation
of a government-imposed terrorist designation. So it would be incredible to suggest
that more sensitive information—that which has been formally classified—should
be released merely because that information is necessary to sustain the
Secretary’s designation determination under the FTO designation scheme.

240
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568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72 (citation omitted).
Id. at 72-73 (citing 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973)). The ten Frankenhauser factors are:
(1) “[t]he extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by
discouraging citizens from giving the government information”;
(2) “the impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed”;
(3) “the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program
improvement will be chilled by disclosure”;
(4) “whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary”;
(5) “whether the party seeking discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any criminal
proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question”;
(6) “whether the investigation has been completed”;
(7) “whether any interdepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or
may arise from the investigation”;
(8) “whether the plaintiff ’s suit is non-frivolous and brought in good faith”;
(9) “whether the information sought is available through other discovery or
from other sources”; and
(10) “the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff’s case.” 59 F.R.D. at 344-45.
244 Al-Aqeel, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
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The Supreme Court has recognized that executive branch officials have a
great deal of discretion in deciding who may access classified national security
information. In Department of Navy v. Egan, the Supreme Court reviewed the
discharge of a naval facility employee due to revocation of his security
clearance and held that a review board lacked statutory authority to review
the underlying clearance revocation.245 Though the decision was made on
statutory grounds, the Court emphasized the great deference the Judiciary
ordinarily gives the Executive in determining who may have access to
classified information and thus considered the decision unreviewable.246
As discussed earlier, when due process requires a hearing, that hearing must
be meaningful. In its third challenge, People’s Mojahedin argued the required
chance to rebut the Secretary’s record could only be meaningful if it included “the
opportunity to present . . . such evidence as those entities may be able to produce
to rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that they
are” terrorist organizations.247 The Government, however, believed that the court
was more than capable of reviewing the information for itself.248 Weighing the
interests, some commentators have argued that due process could be satisfied by
something less than full disclosure of the classified record,249 or by alternate
procedures in which another party could review the classified information.250
Indeed, People’s Mojahedin in its third appearance before the D.C. Circuit
argued that even granting the Government’s compelling interest in protecting
classified information, “the importance of the individual rights affected by an
FTO designation requires narrow tailoring of any significant constraint on the
245
246

See 484 U.S. 518, 520 (1988).
See id. at 529-30 (noting that “unless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and
national security affairs” which includes “the protection of classified information . . . and th[e] broad
discretion to determine who may have access to it”). Although the Fifth Circuit in Toy v. Holder
suggested Egan should be limited to the context of security clearance determinations because of the
extensive process and specialized personnel involved in making those decisions, see 714 F.3d 881, 88586 (2013), there is likewise significant process involved in the collection and evaluation of intelligence
information used by the Secretary of State in making FTO designations. Indeed, the Secretary of
State and intelligence officials compiling the records upon which FTO designations are based are
clearly qualified to assess the risks of releasing classified information to groups that the Secretary has
legitimately determined pose a threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.
247 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 53 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Council I, 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
248 Brief for Respondents, supra note 129, at 43 (arguing the “Court [does not] require[]
assistance in weighing whether the classified information in the Administrative Record helps
establish the reasonableness of the Secretary’s decision to deny the revocation petition”).
249 See Broxmeyer, supra note 35, at 487 (explaining the FTO designation scheme comports
with procedural due process “because the government’s pressing need for prompt action to avoid
the frustration of its compelling national security interest in fighting terrorism outweighs the high
risk of an erroneous deprivation of even a substantial private interest of a designated organization”).
250 See Wyatt, supra note 31, at 257 (proposing “agents of the Department of State who already have
access to classified information, but who are detached from FTO designations, could fill this role”).
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ability to mount an effective challenge.”251 They argued that “[a] blanket
prohibition on even limited access to classified information on which a designation
rests does not satisfy that requirement.”252 People’s Mojahedin asserted, for
example, that giving access to its counsel or to some third party is necessary to
ensure that only restrictions absolutely necessary to protect the Government’s
national security interest are permitted.253 They also suggested requiring the
Secretary to provide an unclassified summary of the information relied on, and
reviewing the classified record and “tailoring its redactions more narrowly” to
ensure that only information that should be classified is actually classified.254
Of course, requiring the Secretary to grant FTOs access to classified
information—regardless of the form—would flatly contradict Congress’s directive
in the text of § 1189.255 Validation of the review Congress intended—limited to the
unclassified record—is not, as People’s Mojahedin asserted, an “abdication of any
duty to engage in meaningful judicial review,”256 but rather a faithful adherence to
the considered view of Congress and a sensible tailoring of the constitutionally
required procedures to the constitutionally implicated interests. And even People’s
Mojahedin apparently recognized the compelling nature of the Government’s
interest in protecting classified information by conceding that, upon judicial review
of the Secretary’s designation, only if the court is inclined to uphold the designation
based on the classified record would “additional disclosures” be needed.257
Certainly Congress judged that the Secretary was both capable and
well-positioned to evaluate the quality of the intelligence and the
national security and foreign policy concerns on which the designation
was based—especially with the support of the U.S. intelligence professionals
furnishing the classified information. Although some have argued that the use
of ex parte, in camera submissions of classified material renders the ability to
present evidence in defense meaningless,258 that argument cannot be taken
seriously. Indeed, People’s Mojahedin itself had a number of high-profile
American officials lobbying the Secretary of State to remove its FTO
251
252
253
254
255

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57-58.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(B) (2012) (“Classified information shall not be subject to
disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a
court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review . . . .”). But see Reply Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 135, at 24 (arguing § 1189 “does not preclude classified information from being permissibly
disclosed where necessary to satisfy due process concerns or simply to facilitate meaningful review,”
and that “the limited sharing of classified information with counsel possessing a security clearance,
for the purpose of facilitating review . . . would not constitute ‘disclosure’ in the statutory sense”).
256 Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 25.
257 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 135, at 51-52.
258 See Nice-Petersen, supra note 34, at 1413 (“Where much of the evidence used to justify a designation
is classified . . . a blocked entity is left without a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in its defense.”).

250

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 213

designation.259 Certainly the Secretary of State—the official responsible for
operationalizing the President’s chartered course for foreign affairs—can be
expected to respond to legitimate countervailing information, national security,
and foreign policy concerns that would warrant revocation of a designation.
Moreover, although § 1189 generally tracks the language of the APA, Congress
replaced the APA’s “substantial evidence” standard—requiring that agency
decisions and actions be supported by substantial evidence in the administrative
record—with § 1189’s “substantial support” language.260 The D.C. Circuit has
observed that the change in language may reflect Congress’ recognition that
“substantial evidence” is “a term of art in administrative law” that typically requires
adversarial, adjudicative procedures by the agency involved, and that therefore
Congress indicated that such procedures were not intended for the FTO scheme.261
Given that § 1189 erects a comprehensive scheme for targeting foreign
organizations, whose constitutional presence in the United States is often based
on minute contacts to begin with, the Judiciary ought to accord Congress’
determination great respect and recognize that the interests of designated
FTOs should not override those of the President and Secretary of State in
providing for the nation’s security. The interests of designated FTOs, under a
traditional due process analysis considering the range of public and private
interests involved, are more than adequately protected by the procedures for
handling classified information provided by § 1189.
C. Comparative Analysis
Although analysis along traditional due process lines is essential to
understanding if § 1189 passes constitutional muster, equally illuminating is a
practical comparison of § 1189 to a post–World War II statutory scheme for
blacklisting organizations. At the onset of the Cold War, a fear of subversive
and Communist infiltration in government agencies led to an Executive Order
creating a designation scheme under which the Attorney General targeted
groups suspected of subversive activities against the U.S. government. The
scheme—which, like the modern FTO designation system, entailed the
Government identifying and labeling private organizations believed to pose a
threat to national security—was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court.

259 See Daniel Benjamin, Giuliani Took Money From a Group That Killed Americans. Does Trump Care?,
POLITICO (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/giuliani-mek-terrorist-groupmoney-bolton-iran-214479 [https://perma.cc/58GM-KB8Q] (detailing lobbying efforts by high-profile
U.S. political figures, including former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani and former U.N. Ambassador
John Bolton, on behalf of People’s Mojahedin in its effort to be removed from the FTO list).
260 Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012), with § 1189(c)(3)(D).
261 People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d 17, 24 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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Although not dealing directly with classified material, the resultant analysis
provides a useful point of comparison between the two schemes.
Similarly, more recent litigation over the Government’s detainment of
terrorism suspects has produced a body of law addressing the use of
classified information in detainees’ legal challenges to their confinement.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, holding that
detainees had the right to challenge their detentions in court, and the
subsequent litigation in lower courts thus provides another point of
reference for considering the role of classified information in the FTO
context—especially given the shared terrorism nexus with § 1189.
1. The Attorney General’s Designation of Subversive Organizations
The FTO designation scheme is not the first time our nation has
blacklisted organizations perceived as a threat to national security. In the
decades after World War II, a similar program was devised for groups aligned
with communist, fascist, and totalitarian movements. The Supreme Court
famously reviewed the constitutionality of this program in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath.262
Executive Order 9835 initiated the so-called “Employees Loyalty Program” for
federal executive branch employees and established a “Loyalty Review Board.”263
The Attorney General was directed to create a list of organizations that he deemed
“totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive.”264 The program was intended to
identify and root out disloyal persons working for the federal government.265 It
provided that the Attorney General’s list of organizations would be used in
proceedings before the Loyalty Review Board when evaluating the loyalty of
individual federal employees.266 Membership in a designated organization
“serve[d] as evidence . . . [against] persons reasonably suspected of disloyalty.”267
As under § 1189, employees in proceedings before the Loyalty Review Board
did not have the ability to challenge the underlying designation of the organization
with which they were affiliated.268 Additionally, “[p]otential members, contributors

262 341 U.S. 123, 129 (1951). Notably, People’s Mojahedin I explicitly recognized some similarity between
§ 1189 and the Cold War–era scheme reviewed by Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee. See 182 F.3d at 22; see
also infra note 318.
263 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 125-28 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9835,
12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947)).
264 Id. at 125 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947)).
265 Id. at 127-28.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 160-61 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
268 See id. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing as “evil” the circumstances “when a
government employee is charged with being disloyal” because the accused “is not allowed to prove
that the charge against the organization is false”).
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or beneficiaries of listed organizations may well be influenced by use of the
designation, for instance, as ground for rejection of applications for commissions in
the armed forces or for permits for meetings in the auditoriums of public housing
projects.”269 Designations under the scheme were “made without notice, without
disclosure of any reasons justifying it, without opportunity to meet the undisclosed
evidence or suspicion on which designation may have been based, and without
opportunity to establish affirmatively that the aims and acts of the organization
[were] innocent.”270 Designation by the Attorney General, like designation as an
FTO by the Secretary of State, came with significant repercussions. Such
designations “cripple[d] the functioning and damage[d] the reputation of those
organizations in their respective communities and in the nation.”271
In Joint Anti-Fascist, the Supreme Court consolidated three cases questioning
“whether . . . the Attorney General of the United States ha[d] authority to
include the complaining organization in a list of organizations designated by
him” pursuant to Executive Order 9835.272 Collectively, the designated groups
complained that their designations by the Attorney General discouraged people
from making financial contributions and participating in organizational
activities, required cancellation of meetings and lectures, revoked federal tax
exemptions, resulted in members being publicly ridiculed, and, in one case,
caused to be “instituted against the [organization] and its members a multiplicity
of administrative proceedings, including those to rescind licenses, franchises,
. . . or to impede the naturalization of its members.”273
The case produced six opinions, none backed by a majority of the Court.
The final judgment, rendered by Justice Burton, remanded the case with a
denial of the Government’s motion to dismiss.274 That opinion, joined by
Justice Douglas, entirely avoided the constitutional due process question.275
Because the Court was considering a motion to dismiss, Justice Burton
reasoned that if the allegations in the complaint were taken as facts, then
the designations made by the Attorney General were not even authorized
by the Executive Order.276 The designations had been “patently arbitrary,”
he wrote, because they were completely unsupported if relying only on “the
very facts alleged by [the organizations] in their own complaints.”277
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Id. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 139 (Burton, J.).
Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 131, 133-35; see also 158-59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 141 (Burton, J.).
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 126.
Id.
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Concurring separately, Justice Black disagreed that the case could be disposed
of so easily—and passionately took issue with the designations, which he derided
as “deadly edicts.”278 In his view, the designations were “the practical equivalents
of confiscation and death sentences for any blacklisted organization.”279 The
President and Attorney General had no authority whatsoever to “determine, list
and publicize individuals and groups as traitors and public enemies,” Justice Black
wrote.280 Justice Black resolutely concluded that “with or without a hearing,” the
lists were unconstitutional—and even if they were constitutional, the Fifth
Amendment would require notice and a hearing beforehand.281
Justice Frankfurter also felt compelled to address the constitutional
challenges to the Attorney General’s designations. Because of the “infinite
variety and perplexity of the tasks of government,” he recognized that a
specific set of due process protections may be fair in some situations and unfair
in others.282 In a prescient opinion issued more than twenty years before
Mathews, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the particular procedures
required by the Constitution must depend on the interests at stake.283
Analyzing the interests at stake in the Attorney General’s designations, Justice
Frankfurter characterized national security as “the greatest of all public interests”
and considered that the designations at issue did not “directly deprive anyone of
liberty of property.”284 He also considered it important that the designations were
made by the Attorney General—the nation’s top law enforcement officer—and that
the scheme had been developed by other duly elected officials sworn to uphold the
Constitution.285 On the other hand, he noted the fact that the Bill of Rights is
predominantly concerned with procedural protections,286 and that hearings have
featured prominently in the Court’s earlier considerations of due process.287 Only
rarely, he noted, had the Court dispensed with a hearing requirement.288
Justice Frankfurter concluded that due process required notice and a
hearing.289 He reasoned that “fairness can rarely be obtained by secret,
278
279
280
281
282
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Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 163 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Compare id. (“The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure
that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is
challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished—these are some of the
considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.”), with supra text accompanying note 74.
284 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 164 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
285 Id.
286 Id. at 164-65.
287 Id. at 166-67.
288 Id. at 167.
289 Id. at 173-74.
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one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights” and that there was no
reason to believe that it would be “impractical or prejudicial to a concrete
public interest to disclose to organizations the nature of the case against
them and to permit them to meet it if they can.”290
Justice Douglas joined these Justices in rejecting the Government’s motion to
dismiss. He also acknowledged the serious consequences of the Attorney
General’s designations—both those that flow indirectly from “public opinion,”
and those that result from regulatory agencies taking action to “penalize or police”
designated organizations following their designations.291 He was also concerned
about the lack of a hearing prior to the designation being made. Reasoning that
notice and a hearing are required “[i]n situations far less severe or important than
these,” including relatively minor civil proceedings of all sorts, he argued that the
same should be required before “determinations that may well destroy” the
designated organization.292 Although he acceded that the Government’s interest
in national security was great, Justice Douglas believed that concern was relevant
“only to those sensitive areas where secrets are or may be available, where critical
policies are being formulated, or where sabotage can be committed.”293
In the last concurring opinion of the case, Justice Jackson agreed a hearing
was required at some point in the designation procedure.294 Justice Jackson
believed the designation by itself “deprive[d] the organizations themselves of
no legal right or immunity,” because their failure to increase membership or
receive financial contributions were “applied by public disapproval, not by
law.”295 Indeed, he reasoned that “[i]f the only effect of the Loyalty Order was
that suffered by the organizations, I should think their right to relief very
dubious.”296 Justice Jackson was primarily concerned about the employees
discharged and barred from future government employment on the basis of
the designation—not the organization itself.297 Although concurring with the
judgement in the case, Justice Jackson—like Justice Frankfurter—felt that
only the individual employees were entitled to a hearing.298
In language paralleling that used by critics of the FTO designation scheme,
Justice Douglas illustrated his qualms with the Attorney General’s list by way of
example—the case of Dorothy Bailey, who was hauled before the Loyalty Review
Board over suspicions that she was affiliated with a Communist front
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

Id. at 170, 172-73.
Id. at 175 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
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organization.299 He recounted that the case against Ms. Bailey was based largely
on FBI reports, but when her lawyer questioned the board chairman, the chairman
was unable to provide any specific information about her accusers’ identities or
affiliations.300 Because she could not obtain any information about the witnesses
against her, Justice Douglas worried, she had “no way of defending” herself against
the charges.301 Such a procedure, he said, “is abhorrent to fundamental justice.”302
Justices Reed, Minton, and Chief Justice Vinson dissented. Although tolerant
of efforts to change social life by methods of persuasion and advocacy, the three
Justices emphasized the nation’s “right and duty to protect its existence against any
force that seeks its overthrow or changes in its structure by other than constitutional
means.”303 They feared a “weakness of will” from a government “indifferent to
manifestations of subversion,” and argued that genuine concern about potential
actions from such organizations required the Government to take action.304
Justice Reed acknowledged that the designation scheme did not require
proof in the usual sense, but only an “examination and determination by the
Attorney General”—and also said that none was needed because the
proceedings were not criminal prosecutions.305 Addressing the organizations’
due process argument, he reasoned that although the designations by the
Attorney General damage the organizations’ “prestige, reputation and earning
power,” they did not “prohibit any business of the organizations, subject them
to any punishment[,] or deprive them of liberty of speech or other freedom.”306
As a result, there was simply “no deprivation of any property or liberty of any
listed organization by the Attorney General’s designation.”307
Justice Reed also found it important that the organizations’ designations did
not have “any finality in determining the loyalty of members” in proceedings
before the Loyalty Review Board.308 Although employees could not directly
contest the underlying designation of an organization, they “do[] have every
opportunity to explain [their] association with that organization.”309 Such an
opportunity, he concluded, was sufficient for constitutional purposes.310 Due
process depends on the particular government action in question, Justice Reed
299
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Id. at 179-83 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 193 (Reed, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 209.
Id. (“The Constitution requires for the employee no more than this fair opportunity
to explain his questioned activities.”).
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reasoned.311 And as such, the “Government should be free to proceed without
notice or hearing” in designating potentially dangerous organizations because
the employees’ rights are thereafter protected by separate proceedings.312 Justice
Reed also pointed to practical reasons for having one executive official make the
designation, deeming it preferable to have the Attorney General conduct one
investigation and make one determination as opposed to separate investigations
“by each of the more than a hundred agencies of government that are catalogued
in the United States Government Organization Manual.”313
Evaluating the Joint Anti-Fascist opinions thus reveals the Justices agreed
that a stigma imposed upon a group by a designation, by itself, did not
implicate the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.314 This
consensus is consistent with this Comment’s analysis of National Council I
and 32 County Sovereignty Committee.315
But more generally, America’s experience with the fear of communist
subversion in the federal government offers several insights for assessing the
constitutionality of § 1189. As Justice Douglas conceded with respect to Ms. Bailey,
she was not charged with a crime, and so she did not have a right to confront the
witnesses against her under the Sixth Amendment.316 And importantly, while
neither employees accused of disloyalty after World War II nor persons charged
with materially supporting terrorist groups may challenge the underlying
designations of the organizations with which they allegedly affiliated, the latter
proceeding is criminal—persons charged with providing material support to an
FTO face a criminal trial, with the full range of constitutional protections afforded
and the corresponding threat of penal punishments.
Moreover, the Joint Anti-Fascist opinions were primarily concerned with
the need to provide notice and the opportunity to rebut the Attorney
General’s decision—a process that, as discussed earlier, the D.C. Circuit has
already required in the FTO context.317 The concurring Justices agreed that
a hearing was needed, but did not elaborate on the precise form of that
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Id. at 212-13.
Id. (“Petitioners will have [post-designation] protection when steps are taken to
punish or enjoin their activities. Where notice and such administrative hearing as the Code
[sic] Federal Regulations prescribes precede punishment, injunction or discharge,
petitioners and their members’ rights to due process are protected.”).
313 Id. at 191-92.
314 See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 704-05 (1976) (“[A]t least six of the eight Justices who
participated in [Joint Anti-Fascist] viewed any ‘stigma’ imposed by official action of the Attorney
General of the United States, divorced from its effect on the legal status of an organization or a
person, . . . as an insufficient basis for invoking the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
315 See supra subsection III.B.2.
316 See id.
317 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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hearing, nor did they require that the Government divulge any sensitive
information in providing such a hearing.
Also significant is the fact that those organizations listed by the Attorney
General were domestic organizations. Indeed, with respect to the
constitutionality of the underlying designation, the crucial analytical difference
between the two schemes is that the FTO scheme targets exclusively foreign
organizations, whereas the groups listed by the Attorney General following World
War II were domestic organizations.318 It is undoubtedly true that, as articulated
by one lower court judge in the proceedings leading up to Joint Anti-Fascist, that
however imprecise the word “subversive” is, “[i]t is highly defamatory” and causes
the organization to “lose reputation, members, supporters, contributions from
government employees and others, valuable privileges, speakers, and meeting
places.” 319 As explained in Section III.B., however, such domestic organizations
may rightfully assert a number of legitimate property and liberty interests that
a foreign organization with minimal contacts to the United States cannot.
Domestic organizations have pre-existing constitutional and statutory rights
to solicit financial and human support, to hold meetings, to express and
publicize their political views, and to possess property in the United States.
Foreign organizations do not enjoy similar rights—certainly not under the
Constitution. Foreign organizations’ lack of due process rights means that the
Government may deprive those organizations of their liberty and property
interests without being required to provide due process.
Comparing the Government’s response to the fight against terrorism to its
actions against communism during the McCarthy era, Professor Cole argued that
America is repeating many of the mistakes of its past.320 But as discussed at length,
there are a number of considerable differences between America’s past and the
contemporary experiences designating foreign groups as terrorist organizations.
Moreover, the fact that the FTO designation scheme was enacted by congressional
act, and not an Executive Order, should warrant even greater deference than was
accorded to the Attorney General’s designations under the Cold War–era scheme.
As Justice Frankfurter acknowledged in his concurring opinion, an act of
Congress should receive more deference from the Judiciary than would a
designation scheme established by the President in an Executive Order.321

318 Indeed, the People’s Mojahedin I court recognized this distinction when it observed that
the two schemes unquestionably “bear some resemblance,” but noted the major difference was that
the organizations challenging their designations in Joint Anti-Fascist were domestic groups, whereas
§ 1189 is specifically directed to foreign organizations. 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
319 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(Edgerton, J., dissenting), rev’d, 341 U.S. 123.
320 See Cole supra note 41, at 28-30.
321 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 173 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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2. Post-9/11 Habeas Cases
Before the D.C. Circuit rendered People’s Mojahedin III, the organizations and
the Government argued about the relevance of the habeas corpus cases stemming
from post-9/11 terror suspect detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court
held the Suspension Clause of the Constitution applied at the U.S. military post at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and that aliens detained there could challenge their
detentions through habeas proceedings.322 However, the Court expressly
disavowed any attempt to resolve issues related to what degree of access to classified
information detainees may have in those proceedings.323 Instead, the Court left
those issues to be worked out by the district courts, acknowledging that “the
Government has a legitimate interest in protecting sources and methods of
intelligence gathering” and “expect[ing] that the District Court will use its
discretion to accommodate this interest to the greatest extent possible.”324
On remand, the district courts set forth the parameters for access to
classified information. In one case, Judge Kessler ordered that “[i]f any
information to be disclosed to Petitioner . . . is classified, the Government shall
provide Petitioner with an adequate substitute and, unless granted an exception,
provide Petitioner’s counsel with the classified information, provided
Petitioner’s counsel is cleared to access such information.”325 However,
recognizing the Government’s compelling interest in safeguarding information
pertinent to national security, the district court further stipulated that the
Government could make a motion to prevent disclosure, citing national security.326
In another case, Al Odah v. United States, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a district
court order “compelling disclosure of certain classified information to counsel
for certain detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.”327 The court remanded the case
to the district court, specifying the findings that must be made before such an
order could be issued.328 The court directed “the habeas court [to] proceed by
determining whether the classified information is material and counsel’s access
to it is necessary to facilitate meaningful review, and whether no alternatives to
access would suffice to provide the detainee with the meaningful opportunity
required by Boumediene.”329 Even in a criminal proceeding, discovery of
classified information requires more than a “mere showing of theoretical
relevance” to the defendant’s case.330 Accordingly, in the habeas context,
322
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Id. at 99.
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Id. at 548.
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“before the district court may compel the disclosure of classified information,
it must determine that the information is both relevant and material—in the
sense that it is at least helpful to the petitioner’s habeas case.”331
Likewise, in Bismullah v. Gates—in which Guantanamo detainees
challenged their designation as enemy combatants by a military tribunal—the
D.C. Circuit explained that detainees’ access to classified information
depended on how necessary such access was to allow for meaningful review of
the record before the court.332 The court issued a protective order granting a
“presumption . . . that counsel for a detainee has a ‘need to know’ the classified
information relating to his client’s case.”333 However, the court also left room
for the Government to withhold “certain highly sensitive information” from
the detainee, although required it still be shown to the court.334
Relatedly, People’s Mojahedin argued a hearing could not be meaningful
without access to the classified information being used against it. Pointing to
Bismullah, People’s Mojahedin argued that ex parte, in camera submission of
the classified record to the court could not allow for the “informed participation
by counsel” necessary to help the court conduct its review of the record.335
People’s Mojahedin lauded the Bismullah court’s development of a
middle-ground approach “aimed at maximizing counsel’s access to the
information while at the same time guarding against inappropriate dissemination
of classified material.”336 Because of “the importance of the rights at stake,” it
asserted, some access to the classified record used by the Secretary of State was
necessary to facilitate meaningful review.337 But the Government countered
that the analogy to the 9/11 habeas cases was misguided: those detentions posed
the threat of “indefinite incarceration of individuals protected by constitutional
habeas rights” and thus involved “a legal and factual scenario obviously
different” from the FTO designation scheme.338
The Government’s position seems to be the stronger one. Dealing with
detainment for a lengthy and perhaps indeterminate amount of time
constitutes a far more onerous burden than deprivation of a group’s ability
to fundraise, solicit membership, and receive support from members of the
public. Moreover, even in the habeas context, the Boumediene Court
recognized the Government’s interest in national security and left the
lower courts free to withhold classified information on a case-by-case basis.
331
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Indeed, the habeas cases illustrate that what constitutes “meaningful”
notice and opportunity to be heard may differ depending upon a number
of factors, including relevance to the petitioner’s case and the importance
of the national security interests involved. The main difference between
the habeas cases and challenges to FTO designations is that the private
interests at stake are significantly greater in the former, such that even
an equivalent interest in national security by the Government should
prevail in the FTO context where it would not in the habeas context.
Finally, habeas proceedings evaluate the detentions of foreign individuals held
by United States officials, either on U.S. territory or on a U.S. military installation
like Guantanamo. As Boumediene properly recognized, the constitutional
protections afforded for these people are very different—and decidedly
stronger—in the habeas context than for organizations in the FTO context.
CONCLUSION
The demands of due process must be respected at all times—even, as Justice
Frankfurter observed in Joint Anti-Fascist, during “times of agitation and anxiety,
when fear and suspicion impregnate the air we breathe.”339 In the twenty years
since the enactment of AEDPA and the creation of the FTO list, no small number
of organizations have been devastated by their designation by the Secretary of
State. According to the State Department, sixty-one organizations are currently
designated as FTOs, and only twelve have ever had their designations removed.340
An FTO designation is no doubt a powerful weapon: affected organizations have
been stripped of much financial, material, and moral support. And it is also true
that the Executive Branch has strong interests in restricting and controlling access
to classified information—and it must be free to collect, use, and rely upon that
information in providing for the nation’s security. This is especially true when
officers’ actions are directed at foreign entities that U.S. intelligence services have
determined pose a legitimate threat to the United States. Respect for this concern
is embodied in the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence, which allows for
procedures tailored to accommodate the public interest.341 And protecting the
nation’s classified information is among the most compelling public interests.342
But the D.C. Circuit’s line of cases confronting § 1189 and its allowance of
the use of classified information by the Secretary of State have failed to
339
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341
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definitively settle whether essential reliance on classified information can satisfy
due process under the Fifth Amendment. But despite the court’s wavering path,
analyzing the court’s jurisprudence and due process principles, and comparing
the designation scheme to McCarthy-era designations and modern habeas
corpus cases, reveals that § 1189’s use of classified information in making FTO
designations comports with due process.
Due process is a “majestic concept” that, although informed by historic
experience, “is also a living principle” that must accommodate new challenges.343
Just as modern-day international terrorism is changing the nature of warfare—and
as technology is changing notions of what is “domestic” and what is “foreign”—due
process must confront the unique situation presented by the FTO designation
scheme and the global fight against terrorism. Congress weighed those concerns
and developed a scheme adapted to accomplish the mission. As Justice Jackson once
wisely declared in the midst of the Second World War, “[c]ivil liberties had their
origin and must find their ultimate guaranty in the faith of the people. If that faith
should be lost, five or nine men in Washington could not long supply its want.”344
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